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Abstract 
 
We examine the business model of traditional commercial banks when they compete with 
shadow banks. While both types of intermediaries create safe “money-like” claims, they go 
about this in different ways. Traditional banks create money-like claims by holding illiquid 
fixed-income assets to maturity, and they rely on deposit insurance and costly equity capital to 
support this strategy. This strategy allows bank depositors to remain “sleepy”: they do not have 
to pay attention to transient fluctuations in the market value of bank assets. In contrast, shadow 
banks create money-like claims by giving their investors an early exit option requiring the rapid 
liquidation of assets. Thus, traditional banks have a stable source of funding, while shadow 
banks are subject to runs and fire-sale losses. In equilibrium, traditional banks have a 
comparative advantage at holding fixed-income assets that have only modest fundamental risk 
but are illiquid and have substantial transitory price volatility, whereas shadow banks tend to 
hold relatively liquid assets. 
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1. Introduction 
What defines the business model of traditional banks in a modern financial system where they 
compete with market-based intermediaries such as “shadow banks”? To address this question, we 
present a model in which traditional and shadow banks coexist in the marketplace. We begin with the 
premise that the primary function of both types of intermediaries is to create safe, “money-like” 
claims that are of value to households because they are useful for transactions purposes (Gorton and 
Pennacchi, 1990; Stein, 2012; DeAngelo and Stulz, 2015). However, traditional banks and shadow 
banks invest in different portfolios of assets to support such claims. Traditional banks hold illiquid 
fixed-income assets, such as long-term securities and loans, which may be subject to substantial 
short-run price fluctuations but have little long-run fundamental risk. To hold such assets, they 
maintain a costly equity cushion in their capital structure but also rely on deposit insurance and other 
elements of the government safety net. This strategy allows bank depositors to remain “sleepy”: they 
do not have to pay attention to transient fluctuations in the mark-to-market value of bank assets and 
never run. In contrast, the shadow banking system—intermediation chains that often involve money 
market funds—relies less on the government safety net and costly equity capital. For shadow banks, 
manufacturing money-like claims requires them to hold more liquid assets that can be easily sold at 
only a modest discount should their investors decide to exit. 
We see asset fire sales as a key source of illiquidity. In our model, asset liquidations 
temporarily push prices below fundamental value. So, on the one hand, traditional banks’ more stable 
deposit funding structure has an advantage: it enables them to hold investments to maturity, riding 
out transitory valuation shocks until prices revert to fundamental values. On the other hand, funding 
stability is expensive due to higher costs of equity capital and regulatory compliance. Because the 
endogenous fire-sale discount is greater when shadow banks hold more of an asset, this tradeoff pins 
down the equilibrium holdings of any given asset across intermediary types. The most liquid assets 
are held entirely by shadow banks, while less liquid (but fundamentally low risk) assets are held 
entirely by commercial banks. When an asset is held by both intermediary types, the relative holdings 
of banks and shadow banks must be such that the expected loss to a shadow bank from liquidating an 
asset at a temporary discount to fundamental value is just balanced by the added cost a traditional 
bank pays for more stable funding.  
This logic leads to our main finding: for traditional banks there is a critical synergy between 
the asset and liability sides of the balance sheet. Issuing stable money-like claims is complementary 
to investing in fixed-income assets that have only modest fundamental risk but are relatively illiquid 
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and may have substantial exposure to interim fire-sale risk and the accompanying transitory price 
volatility. In our view, this synergy between funding structure and asset choice is at the heart of the 
modern business of commercial banking and is what fundamentally distinguishes traditional banks 
from shadow banks: traditional banks are patient investors that can invest in illiquid fixed-income 
assets with little risk of being interrupted before maturity. 
While our formal model emphasizes fire sales (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992), our message 
would also emerge in other models in which early liquidation can occur at prices below fundamental 
value. For example, early liquidation can be costly in models that combine noise trader shocks with 
limited arbitrageur risk-bearing capacity (DeLong et al., 1990; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
Alternatively, liquidation costs could come from adverse selection (Gorton and Pennacchi, 1990; 
Dang, Gorton, and Holmstrom, 2013). The general point is that transitory nonfundamental 
movements in asset prices are central to understanding financial intermediation and especially the 
connection between the asset and liability sides of intermediary balance sheets. A stable funding 
structure is an important source of comparative advantage for holding assets that are vulnerable to 
transitory price movements. In this way, traditional banks are similar to deep-pocket arbitrageurs who 
specialize in fixed-income assets. 
It is important to stress that what our model actually pins down is not literally the roles of 
different types of legal institutions (e.g., commercial banks or money market funds) but rather the 
equilibrium mix between two intermediation strategies that use risky assets to back money-like 
claims. For any given asset, our model asks how much of its total supply will be intermediated using 
a “stable funding strategy” that relies on an equity cushion and insured deposits, and how much will 
be intermediated using an “unstable funding strategy” in which investors protect the safety of their 
claims with an early exit option. The interdependencies between asset characteristics and funding 
strategies are the true equilibrium outcomes of our model. In reality, there is a close correspondence 
between funding strategies and specific legal forms. In particular, when intermediaries are 
distinguished by their access to deposit insurance and the lender of last resort, commercial banks are 
the dominant institutional vehicle for implementing the stable funding strategy. And we primarily 
associate the unstable funding strategy with the so-called shadow banking system. 
We motivate our analysis in Section 2 by presenting some stylized facts about the assets and 
liabilities of modern commercial banks. We show that commercial banks have significant holdings of 
relatively illiquid long-term fixed-income securities, such as asset-backed securities, mortgage-
backed securities, and corporate bonds. At the same time, banks generally avoid the most liquid debt 
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securities, such as short-term money market paper and Treasuries, as well as highly risky securities 
such as equities. These facts offer important clues for understanding the business of commercial 
banking. In Section 3, we present our model of alternative strategies for supporting money-like 
claims and show how commercial and shadow banks coexist in equilibrium. We then turn to some 
evidence bearing on our model’s key predictions about the connections between the asset and liability 
sides of intermediary balance sheets. 
Section 4 briefly takes a historical look at the US commercial banking industry. We find that 
prior to the introduction of federal deposit insurance, US commercial banks followed a strategy that 
resembles that of shadow banks today. Like today, a commercial bank in, say, 1870, was in the 
business of taking deposits and thereby offering its customers safe money-like claims. At the same 
time, commercial banks in 1870 held assets with much shorter maturities and experienced more runs 
than they do today. The shift of commercial bank assets to longer-maturity loans and long-term 
securities can be linked to the introduction of deposit insurance, as our model predicts.  
Another way to examine the predictions of the model is to look at the asset and liability 
structures of financial institutions more broadly. In Section 5, we use the Financial Accounts of the 
United States (formerly the Flow of Funds) to provide some contemporary aggregate evidence 
addressing the model’s key predictions. In the data, looking across fixed-income asset classes, 
today’s traditional banks have a larger market share in more illiquid assets, be they loans or 
securities. Similarly, looking across financial intermediary types, intermediaries with more stable 
funding such as traditional banks have asset portfolios that are more illiquid. In this way, our model 
yields a novel synthesis of several aggregate facts about the structure of financial intermediation. 
Our paper relates to several strands in the literature. Our starting point is the liability-centric 
view of banks, which holds that an important part of banks’ value comes from their ability to 
manufacture safe money-like liabilities.1 This view helps make sense of the fact that, in contrast to 
nonfinancial firms, banks have capital structures that are highly homogeneous in both the cross-
section and the time series: they are almost always heavily deposit-financed. At the same time, this 
liability-centric view does not explain why banks hold illiquid loans and securities.2 To the contrary, 
the liability-centric view has led some observers to advocate narrow banking, whereby bank-created 
                                                 
1 This view has its roots in Gorton and Pennacchi (1990). Recent papers in this vein include Dang, Gorton, and 
Holmstrom (2013), DeAngelo and Stulz (2015), Gennaioli et al. (2013), Stein (2012), and Krishnamurthy and Vissing-
Jorgensen (2015). 
2 Asset-centric theories of banking, such as those that see banks as delegated monitors (Diamond, 1984), do not draw a 
distinction between banks and other nonbank lenders, which we see as critical. 
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money is backed entirely by safe liquid assets such as Treasury bills (see Pennacchi, 2012). As a 
positive description of commercial banking, however, narrow banking is very far from what we 
observe in the world and is unlikely to break even. The challenge is to understand why banks 
simultaneously finance themselves with deposits and hold long-term and illiquid fixed-income assets. 
A second group of theories explicitly addresses the question of what ties together the asset 
and liability sides of bank balance sheets—i.e., why is it that the same institutions that create private 
money choose to back their safe money-like claims not by investing in T-bills but rather by investing 
in loans and other relatively illiquid assets? What is the synergy between these two activities? In a 
classic contribution, Diamond and Dybvig (1983) argue that banks allow households who are unsure 
of the timing of their consumption needs to invest more efficiently in long-lived projects that are 
costly to interrupt early.3 Diamond and Dybvig emphasize deposit insurance as the source of stability 
that keeps depositors sleepy and prevents runs. We use this observation to address a question not 
taken up by Diamond and Dybvig: what types of assets are optimal for deposit-insured banks to hold?  
Several other studies have focused on potential complementarities between banks’ assets and 
liabilities. Diamond and Rajan (2001) suggest that the fragility of runnable bank deposits disciplines 
bank management, enhancing the value of illiquid bank loans. Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2002) 
highlight the similarities between demand deposits and loan commitments, and the ability of an 
institution that offers both to economize on costly liquidity buffers; Gatev and Strahan (2006) provide 
supporting evidence for this view. Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (2013) also argue that a central 
function of banks is to provide money-like claims but focus on asset-side diversification and 
tranching as technologies for backing such safe liabilities. DeAngelo and Stulz (2015) emphasize 
diversification and risk-management strategies to reduce the riskiness of bank assets. 
 Our work also connects with several other themes. First, a number of papers explore the joint 
roles of banks and securities markets in allocating credit and satisfying the demand for liquidity 
(Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997; Diamond, 1997). Second, several papers study the shadow banking 
system and its role in the financial crisis (Coval, Jurek, and Stafford, 2009; Shleifer and Vishny, 
2010; Gorton and Metrick, 2011; Diamond and Rajan, 2011; Stein, 2012; Gennaioli, Shleifer, and 
Vishny, 2012,  2013; Kacperczyk and Schnabl, 2013; Krishnamurthy, Nagel, and Orlov, 2014; 
Chernenko and Sunderam, 2014; Sunderam, 2015; Moreira and Savov, 2014). Finally, a few recent 
                                                 
3 Taken literally, the Diamond-Dybvig model does not admit a rationale for banks to hold marketable securities; see 
Jacklin (1987).  Taken less literally, the model makes no predictions on the kinds of assets banks would hold.   
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papers measure the mismatch between the liquidity of intermediary assets and liabilities 
(Brunnermeier, Gorton, and Krishnamurthy, 2014; and Bai, Krishnamurthy, and Weymuller, 2015). 
 
2. Motivating evidence 
2.1. Fact 1: Bank liabilities are highly homogeneous 
Banks’ liability structures are highly homogeneous: banks are almost always financed largely 
with deposits. This finding holds both in the cross-section and over time. In the cross-section, Table 1 
shows various balance sheet items as a share of total assets at the end of 2012 for US commercial 
banks. To assess the cross-sectional heterogeneity in balance sheets, we show the value-weighted 
average share, the 90th percentile, and the 10th percentile for each item. To avoid the idiosyncrasies 
associated with the smallest banks, we focus on banks with assets greater than $1 billion. Table 1 
reveals a high degree of homogeneity in the amount of deposit funding. The average bank finances 
76% of its assets with deposits. A bank at the 90th percentile in terms of the distribution is 89% 
deposit-financed, only a bit more than a bank at the 10th percentile, which is 74% deposit-financed. A 
similar pattern holds in the time series for the banking industry as a whole. Fig. 1 shows the evolution 
of the aggregate balance sheets of US banks from 1896 to 2012. As shown in Panel A, banks’ 
liability structures have been very stable over the past 115 years. Deposits have financed 80% of bank 
assets on average with an annual standard deviation of just 8%.  
[Insert Fig. 1 about here] 
These patterns are in sharp contrast to those for nonfinancial firms, where capital structure 
tends to be far less determinate, both within industries and over time. This suggests that for banks—
unlike nonfinancials, and counter to the spirit of Modigliani and Miller (1958)—an important part of 
their economic value creation takes place on the liability side of the balance sheet, via deposit-taking. 
This is broadly consistent with the literature that has followed Gorton and Pennacchi (1990). 
2.2. Fact 2: Bank assets are more heterogeneous 
There is considerably more heterogeneity on the asset side of bank balance sheets and in 
particular in their mix between loans and securities. In the 2012 cross-section, a bank at the 10th 
percentile of the distribution had a ratio of securities to assets of 6.9%, while for a bank at the 90th 
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percentile, the ratio was almost six times higher at 40.7%.4 One interpretation of this heterogeneity is 
as follows: while lending is obviously very important for a majority of banks, a bank’s scale need not 
be pinned down by the nature of its lending opportunities. Rather, in some cases, it seems that a 
bank’s size is determined by its deposit franchise, and that taking deposits as given, its problem 
becomes one of how to best invest them. Again, this liability-centric perspective is very different 
from how we are used to thinking about nonfinancial firms, whose scale is almost always presumed 
to be driven by their opportunities on the asset side of the balance sheet. 
2.3. Fact 3: Bank securities portfolios do not seem to be precautionary liquidity buffers 
While banks are quite heterogeneous in their mix between loans and securities, within the 
category of securities, banks appear to have relatively well-defined preferences. As can be seen in 
Table 1 and Panel A of Fig. 2, banks hold little in the way of Treasury and agency securities: these 
two categories accounted for just 7.7% and 5.8% of total securities holdings on a value-weighted 
basis in 2012. The bulk of their holdings are in agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and other 
types of mortgage-linked securities such as collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs) and 
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS): these collectively accounted for 57.7% of securities 
holdings in 2012. Also important is the “other” category, which includes corporate and municipal 
bonds as well as asset-backed securities, and which accounted for 29.3% of holdings in 2012. 
[Insert Table 1 and Fig. 2 about here] 
This composition of banks’ securities portfolios is not what one would expect if banks were 
simply holding securities as a highly liquid buffer stock against unexpected deposit outflows or loan 
commitment drawdowns. It also appears at odds with the narrow-banking premise that one can 
profitably exploit a deposit franchise simply by taking deposits and parking them in T-bills. Rather, it 
looks as if banks are purposefully taking on some mix of duration, credit, and prepayment risk in 
order to earn a spread relative to T-bills. Indeed, over the period from 1984 to 2012, the average 
spread on banks’ securities portfolio relative to bills was 1.73%.  
In this vein, it is interesting to ask how profitable banks would be in a counterfactual world in 
which their deposit-taking behavior was exactly the same, but instead of allocating their securities 
holdings as they actually do, they followed a narrow-banking strategy of investing only in T-bills. 
                                                 
4 These figures on securities holdings do not include banks’ holdings of cash and reverse repo, which averaged 10.2% and 
4.1% of assets on a value-weighted basis in 2012. 
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The profitability of a narrow bank that takes deposits DEP at a rate ܴ஽ா௉ and invests them in T-bills 
paying RF, while incurring deposit-related noninterest expenses of NONINTEXP (e.g., employee 
salaries, bricks-and-mortar expenses associated with bank branches, and other operating expenses) 
and earning deposit-related noninterest income of NONINTINC (e.g., services charges on deposit 
accounts) is given by 
  .F DEP NONINTINC NONINTEXPR R DEP DEP      (1)  
We carry out this calculation for the aggregate commercial banking industry from 1984 to 
2012. To compute the gross deposit spread, RF – RDEP, we use the rate on 3-month Treasury bills as 
our proxy for RF and compute RDEP from Call Reports as the interest paid on deposits divided by 
deposits. Deposit rates appear to embed a significant convenience premium relative to short-term 
market rates: the gross deposit spread averages 0.87% over our 29-year sample. We next add the 
noninterest income that banks earn from service charges on deposit accounts from Call Reports. This 
averages 0.49% of deposits over our sample. Finally, we subtract the noninterest expense associated 
with deposit-taking. This is not directly available from Call Reports: banks report their total 
noninterest expense, but we are interested only in that portion attributable to deposit-taking.5 As 
detailed in the Internet Appendix, we use a hedonic-regression approach to infer the expenses 
associated with deposit-taking. Although these expenses have trended down due to advances in 
information technology, they remain substantial, averaging 1.30% of deposits over the past 29 years. 
Combining these pieces as in Eq. (1), we estimate the average profitability of narrow banking 
between 1984 and 2012 to be 0.06% of deposits (0.06% = 0.87% + 0.49% – 1.30%).6 In other words, 
the interest rate differential between deposits and short-term marketable rates and the associated fee 
income is largely offset by the direct costs of operating a deposit-taking franchise. Given these 
numbers, it is perhaps not surprising that banks choose to invest in riskier securities that earn a spread 
relative to T-bills. Of course, the large costs of deposit-taking that we document ultimately represent 
an endogenous choice for traditional banks, and so must be explained as an equilibrium outcome in 
any fully satisfactory model. For example, banks could always choose to hold down costs by offering 
                                                 
5 In 2012, banks had noninterest operating expenses equal to 2.96% of total assets. These can be decomposed into wage 
and salary expenses of 1.32%, building occupancy expenses of 0.32%, and other expenses of 1.32%. 
6 This 0.06% figure is probably an upper bound on the profitability of narrow banking. As explained in the Internet 
Appendix, our methodology for attributing bank expenses to different activities leaves an unallocated cost, which can be 
thought of as fixed overhead. This overhead cost averages 0.63% of deposits from 1984 to 2012. If 50% of this amount is 
allocated back to deposit-taking, the estimated profitability of narrow banking drops to -0.25%. 
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fewer physical branch services to their customers, similarly to money market mutual funds.  We 
return to the endogeneity of deposit-taking expenses below. 
2.4. Discussion 
Our synthesis of these stylized facts is that traditional banks are in the business of taking 
deposits and investing these deposits in fixed-income assets that have certain well-defined risk and 
liquidity attributes, but which can be either loans or securities. The information-intensive nature of 
traditional lending—in the Diamond (1984) delegated monitoring sense—while important in many 
cases, may not be the defining feature of banking. Rather, the defining feature may be that, whether 
they are information-intensive loans or relatively transparent securities, banks seek to invest in fixed-
income assets that have some degree of price volatility and illiquidity, and so offer a higher return 
than very liquid and low-risk Treasury securities. In this sense, small business loans, asset-backed 
securities, and CMOs are on one side of the fence and Treasuries on the other. 
Before proceeding, we should address a natural first reaction to this interpretation. Perhaps 
banks’ propensity to invest in risky securities merely reflects the fact that they are taking advantage 
of the put option created by deposit insurance. In other words, the evidence we have assembled on the 
patterns of banks’ securities holdings may merely reflect a moral hazard problem. 
One way to address this hypothesis is to redo the analysis in Panel A of Fig. 2 restricting the 
sample to those banks with the highest levels of capital at any point in time—those whose equity-to-
assets ratio is above the median. This is done in Panel B of Fig. 2. The basic patterns for highly 
capitalized banks in Panel B are very similar to those in Panel A for all banks. Given that these highly 
capitalized banks are less likely to impose losses on the deposit-insurance fund, we suspect that there 
is something deeper here than can be explained by a simple appeal to deposit-insurance-induced 
moral hazard. 
 
3. Model 
We develop a simple model in which banks and shadow banks compete as buyers of assets 
with different degrees of fundamental and liquidity risk. By raising expensive equity capital and 
gaining access to government deposit insurance, traditional banks obtain stable funding and are able 
to avoid asset fire sales. As a result, traditional banks can create money-like claims by patiently 
investing in illiquid fixed-income assets, which have little long-run fundamental risk but are 
vulnerable to short-term price volatility. Shadow banks have less expensive funding but are 
vulnerable to runs and early asset liquidations. While their reliance on early exit means that shadow 
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banks can create money-like claims by investing in assets with higher fundamental risk, these assets 
must be more liquid. Although we use the terms “traditional bank” and “shadow bank,” we 
emphasize that the model speaks to intermediation strategies as opposed to specific legal institutions. 
3.1. Setting 
The basic structure of the model is similar to Stein (2012). The model has three dates: t = 0, 1, 
and 2. There are N long-lived risky assets indexed by i = 1, 2, …, N. Asset i is available in a fixed 
supply of Qi. For simplicity, we assume that the payoffs on these assets are perfectly correlated, and 
that assets only differ in the magnitudes of their payoffs in the bad state of the world. The individual 
assets in our model might correspond to corporate loans, mortgages, mortgage-backed securities 
(MBS), USTreasuries, or even equities. 
The model features three types of actors: households, traditional banks, and shadow banks. 
Households do not directly own any of the risky assets. Instead, households invest in safe and risky 
claims issued by traditional and shadow banks, which in turn back these claims by holding the 
underlying risky assets. Intermediation is efficient here because households are willing to pay a 
premium for completely safe claims, and some form of intermediation is required to create safety—
none of the primitive assets are themselves completely safe. 
Households derive utility from both consumption and from monetary services. Our key 
assumption is that monetary services can only be derived from holding claims that are completely 
safe: if a claim has any risk it provides no monetary services. Outside of this demand for money-like 
claims, households are assumed to be risk-neutral with respect to fluctuations in their consumption. 
Thus, once a claim has any risk, the discount rate applied by households is fixed at a discretely higher 
level. This corresponds to the following household utility function from Stein (2012): 
0 2[ ] ,U C E C M     (2)
 
where the notational convention is that a household has M dollars of money-like claims if it has 
claims that are guaranteed to pay off an amount M at t = 2. The discount factor applied to all risky 
claims is thus  ≤ 1, while the discount factor applied to safe money-like claims is +  where  ≥ 0. 
The former follows from the observation that a household is indifferent between having  units of 
time-0 consumption and a risky claim that delivers one unit of time-2 consumption in expectation. 
The latter follows from the fact that a household is indifferent between having  +  units of time-0 
consumption and a riskless claim that always delivers one unit of time-2 consumption. Such a claim 
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delivers  units of utility from expected future consumption, along with an additional  units of utility 
from current monetary services. 
When  > 0, the discount rate applied to safe money-like claims, 1/(+ ), is less than the 
discount rate applied to risky claims, 1/. As in Stein (2012), Gennaioli et al. (2013), and DeAngelo 
and Stulz (2015), the assumptions of the Modigliani-Miller (1958) theorem no longer hold, and the 
value of a risky asset may depend on the way it is financed using safe and risky claims.7 
Time t = 1
Pessimistic news arrives with 
probability 1–p. Unstable 
banks must sell at a discount, 
ki. Stable banks are able to 
hold to maturity. 
Time t = 0
Banks purchase the risky asset 
and issue safe and risky claims 
to households.
Fundamental value after 
pessimistic news at t=1 is
Fi = qR + (1–q–)zi. 
However, the market 
price is only kiFi ≤ Fi.
Time t = 2
Payoff on risky asset revealed. 
Payoff on claims issued to 
households also revealed.
p
1–p
q
1–q–
R
0
zi

Disaster
state
Bad
state
Good
stateOptimistic
news
Pessimistic
news
 
The timing of the model is as follows. Each risky asset i pays R at t = 2 if the aggregate 
economic state of the world is good, but a lower amount zi < R if the aggregate economic state is bad. 
In addition, there is a very small probability of an economic disaster, in which case all risky assets 
pay zero. At time 1, there is an interim news event about the future economic state. With probability 
p, the interim news is optimistic, which means that the aggregate state will be good at time 2, and all 
assets will definitely pay R. With probability (1–p), the news is pessimistic, which means that there is 
a subsequent probability q of the good state in which all assets pay R, an  probability of the disaster 
state in which all assets pay zero, and a (1–q–) probability of the bad state in which asset i pays zi. 
Thus, after pessimistic news at time 1, the fundamental value of asset i is Fi = qR + (1–q–)zi. 
                                                 
7 The assumption that all money-like claims are perfect substitutes is a simplification. Sunderam (2015) explores 
imperfect substitutability between different money-like claims. 
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The small probability of an economic disaster—the existence of tail risk—means that it is 
impossible for financial intermediaries to raise uninsured funding that is both stable and completely 
safe. In other words, intermediaries can only manufacture safe money-like claims by either relying on 
an early exit option, in which case the resulting funding is unstable, or on deposit insurance, in which 
case it is stable. Thus, our assumption that  > 0 is a simple way of capturing the robust fact that 
intermediaries who rely heavily on short-term, uninsured funding have always been vulnerable to 
run-like withdrawals when bad news arrives. Of course, if  = 0, it would be possible to raise stable 
funding without deposit insurance by simply limiting the amount of short-term claims to the worst-
case payoff, zi. All of our formal results carry through in the special case where  = 0. However, in 
this case, the quantity of stable deposits is limited by asset payoffs in the worst possible scenario.  
Our central assumption deals with the difference between the fundamental value of asset i at 
time 1 and its market value. We assume that, if there is pessimistic news at time 1, the market value 
of asset i is kiFi ≤ Fi. When ki < 1, this market price reflects a fire-sale discount to fundamental value. 
The value of ki is endogenous and asset-specific and depends on the equilibrium quantity of asset i 
that is liquidated at time 1. We return to this feature momentarily. 
 Because our model only features aggregate risk and the payoffs on all assets are perfectly 
correlated, we are abstracting away from the need for diversification and risk management, which 
DeAngelo and Stulz (2015) see as central to intermediaries’ ability to produce safe money-like 
claims. Our approach can be thought of as reflecting the idea that intermediaries have already done 
the best they can on these diversification and risk-management fronts, leaving only aggregate risk 
that cannot be diversified away or hedged. 
3.2. Intermediation strategies 
To examine the different ways that risky assets can be held and used as backing to create safe 
money-like claims, we consider two intermediation strategies: stable traditional banking and unstable 
shadow banking. At t = 0, households can invest in either traditional or shadow bank deposits, both of 
which are completely safe and are valued at +  per dollar paid at t = 2. Alternatively, households 
can buy bank equity or shadow bank equity, both of which are risky and are valued at  per dollar 
paid in expectation at t = 2. Fraction i of risky asset i is purchased by shadow banks at t = 0, and 
fraction 1–i is purchased by traditional banks. We examine how the equilibrium market shares of the 
traditional and shadow banking strategies vary as we change the properties of the asset in question. 
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3.2.1. Traditional banking 
The traditional banking strategy uses deposit insurance and a hold-to-maturity investment 
approach to back safe money-like claims. A combination of risk-based capital requirements and fairly 
priced deposit insurance prevents traditional banks from exploiting the deposit insurance fund. 
Specifically, we assume that the government offers traditional banks actuarially fair deposit insurance 
that pays off in the disaster state. With a small probability of an economic disaster, traditional banks’ 
hold-to-maturity strategy can only be used to create money-like claims if it is combined with deposit 
insurance. To protect taxpayers from further exposure, the government imposes a particular form of 
risk-based capital regulation: the bank is required to hold enough capital against any asset i such that 
the deposit insurer never suffers losses in equilibrium in the bad (as opposed to the disaster) state. 
Since the bank plans to always hold the risky asset to maturity, the maximum amount of insured 
money-like claims that can be created using asset i under this regulatory regime is zi, which is the 
payoff in the bad state at time 2. To satisfy the risk-based capital rule, the remainder of the asset 
purchase must be financed by risky equity capital, which is more expensive. Since the disaster state 
occurs with probability (1–p) and deposit insurance pays zi in this state, the actuarially fair 
insurance premium discounted back to time 0 is (1–p)zi. 
In the literal context of the model, capital regulation and the deposit insurance premium are 
the only costs to being a deposit-insured bank with stable funding, as opposed to a shadow bank with 
unstable funding. More broadly, however, one might interpret what we are calling the cost of equity 
capital as encompassing a variety of other costs that go along with being a traditional bank. These 
include the costs of other types of regulation as well as the bricks-and-mortar costs of setting up the 
sort of branch network that attracts sticky retail deposits. 
The total value of claims the bank can issue at time 0 using the risky asset i as backing is 

Value of bank deposits Insurance premium Value of bank equity
Expected cash flowsMoney premium
( ) (1 ) ( (1 ) )( )
          [ (1 ) ],
B
i i i i
i i
V z p z p p q R z
z pR p F
   
 
       
   
  
  (3)
 
where, again, Fi = qR + (1–q–)zi is the fundamental value of asset i following pessimistic news at 
time 1. In any equilibrium where banks hold asset i, banks’ zero profit condition ensures that the 
market value of asset i equals BiV . Because households are willing to pay a premium for absolutely 
safe claims, Eq. (3) shows that the total value of claims issued by banks exceeds the expected cash 
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flows on the risky asset discounted at the risky rate: banks capture a money premium of zi because 
deposit insurance enables them to use the risky asset to back zi units of money-like claims. 
3.2.2. Shadow banking 
An alternative intermediation strategy for creating safe money-like claims is shadow banking. 
In the real world, what we are calling the shadow banking strategy often involves a chain of market-
based transactions which can involve several distinct legal institutions. 
Perhaps the simplest of these institutions is a money market fund (MMF) that invests in assets 
that are completely riskless, such as Treasury bills, and issues what are effectively deposits to 
households. Things become more complex when the asset ultimately backing the MMF deposits is 
not completely risk-free. To ensure that the MMF deposits are truly safe, some institution along the 
intermediation chain must contribute financing in the form of equity capital. At the end of the chain, 
households own a combination of money-like MMF deposits and highly levered equity. 
This shadow banking strategy can be implemented using several alternative institutional 
arrangements, with more or fewer links in the chain. For example, a mortgage-backed security (MBS) 
may ultimately wind up backing money-like claims in several ways: 
 A broker-dealer affiliate of a universal commercial bank finances the MBS using its own 
equity and a short-term repurchase agreement with a money market fund. 
 A hedge fund acquires the MBS using its own equity and an overnight collateralized loan—a 
bilateral repo—from its prime broker. The prime broker, in turn, uses the same collateral to 
borrow from a money fund in the tri-party repo market, a process called “rehypothecation.” 
 A structured investment vehicle finances the MBS using its own equity and asset-backed 
commercial paper that is then sold to a money market fund or an institutional cash manager. 
In each case, the common denominator is that there is a short-term claim at the end of the chain that 
is “flighty”—i.e., vulnerable to withdrawal in a bad state—because it is uninsured and protected only 
by the ability to exit early and liquidate the underlying collateral. 
To fix ideas, it may be helpful to think of a simplified two-step chain consisting of a highly 
leveraged intermediary (HL) such as a broker-dealer along with a money market fund (MMF). The 
HL buys the risky asset and issues short-term repo against it, which is then held by the MMF. MMF 
deposits and HL equity are owned by households. The MMF does not have capital or access to 
government deposit insurance, so for its deposits to be riskless, its repo holdings must also be 
riskless. This is the case because if there is pessimistic news at time 1, the MMF seizes the repo 
collateral and sells it at the fire-sale price of kiFi. The maximum amount of safe money that can be 
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created by a shadow bank is therefore kiFi. Unlike traditional bank depositors protected by deposit 
insurance and bank equity capital, an MMF that invests in repo cannot afford to sleep through time 1; 
the MMF’s ability to pull the plug at this interim date is essential to keeping its claim safe. Uninsured 
shadow banking deposits are therefore an endogenous form of “hot” money: they are unstable rather 
than stable short-term funding.8 
The total value of claims that the shadow banking system can create using the risky asset i as 
a backing is then given by 
Value of MMF deposits Value of HL equity Expected cash flowsMoney premium
( ) ( ) ( ) [ (1 ) ].i i i i i i i i i
S
iV k k F p R k F k F pR p k F           
  
 (4)
 
In any equilibrium where shadow banks hold asset i, their zero profit condition ensures that the 
market value of asset i must equal ( )i
S
iV k . 
3.3. Equilibrium 
We assume that shadow banks face a downward-sloping demand curve at time 1, so the fire-
sale price is a decreasing function of the amount of the asset that is liquidated. Formally, let 0 i
be an exogenous parameter that indexes the illiquidity in the secondary market. We assume that 
( , ) / 0i i ik      , so demand is downward-sloping, and 2 ( , ) / 0i i i ik        , so more illiquid 
assets have steeper demand curves. Finally, as a normalization, we assume that ( ,0) 1ik    for all i : 
when 0i  the asset is perfectly liquid and there is never any fire-sale discount. As shown in the 
Internet Appendix, a fire-sale discount of this form can be micro-founded as in Stein (2012).9 
Since intermediaries are risk-neutral, and there are no benefits of diversification built into our 
model, intermediaries’ willingness to hold asset i is not impacted by their holdings of asset j ≠ i. As a 
                                                 
8 Households only derive monetary services from claims that are guaranteed to be a safe store of value through time 2. 
For shadow banks, safety requires early exit and hence a fire sale if the bad state occurs at time 1. However, ex post, the 
expected value is higher, albeit riskier, if the assets are held to maturity. So what ensures that the assets will be sold, 
thereby making good on the promise of safety? For some shadow banking chains, there may be coordination problems 
that lead to Diamond-Dybvig (1983) style runs which force the fire sale. However, even in the absence of coordination 
problems—e.g., if each MMF that invests in repo is protected by a segregated piece of collateral—commitment 
technologies can force the sale. For instance, MMFs are prohibited from holding the long-term assets that serve as 
collateral for repos, which commits them to fire-selling this collateral. While this may lead to inefficiencies ex post, it is 
optimal for MMFs ex ante, as it helps to assure their investors that their claims will be kept safe. 
9 Specifically, we assume that the risky asset is sold to a third type of intermediary (also owned by households) who has 
fixed resources and access to outside investment opportunities at t = 1. Since these opportunities are characterized by 
diminishing returns, shadow banks must offer larger discounts to induce these intermediaries to purchase more assets, 
thereby forgoing increasingly productive outside opportunities. In this context, differences across assets in i reflect 
differences in the number of potential second-best holders of each asset—i.e., differences in asset specificity. 
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consequence, market equilibrium in any asset i naturally decouples from that in asset j ≠ i. An 
equilibrium for asset i is a *i  such that 
* *
*
*
( ( , ))   for (0,1)
( (0, ))      0
( (1, ))      1.
B S
i i i i i
B S
i i i i
B S
i i i i
V V k
V V k
V V k
  
 
 




 


 (5) 
The model admits both interior and corner solutions, depending on the asset-specific values of zi and 
φi. It is consistent with the possibility that some assets (e.g., highly illiquid loans) are held only by 
banks, some (e.g., Treasuries) are held predominantly by shadow banks, and some (e.g., MBS) are 
held in significant amounts by both intermediary types. 
Formally, since ( ) /( , ) ( / ) ( )/ 0,S Si i i i i ikV k V k            asset i is held entirely by 
traditional banks when ( (0, ))B Si i iV V k   and entirely by shadow banks when ( (1, ))B Si i iV V k  .10 
Because shadow banks dominate traditional banks when there is no fire-sale discount (i.e., we always 
have (1)B Si iV V ), we only have a corner equilibrium where the asset is held entirely by traditional 
banks when (0, ) 1ik   . By contrast, if (0, ) 1ik   , then shadow banks must always hold some of the 
asset in equilibrium. 
At an interior equilibrium in which both traditional and shadow banks hold the asset, the fire-
sale discount ki is such that both traditional and shadow banks earn zero profits by buying the asset 
and issuing claims backed by it. Thus, at an interior equilibrium,  
  
* *
Marginal benefit of stable funding: Marginal cost of stable funding:
avoiding fire-sale liquidations reduced money creation
(1 ) 1 ( , ) ( , ) .i i i i i i ip k F k F z                  
 
 (6)
 
Eq. (6) says that the mix between shadow banks and traditional banks must be such that the marginal 
benefit of stable bank funding equals the marginal cost of stable funding. Stable funding allows 
traditional banks to avoid the fire-sale liquidation discount if there is pessimistic news at time 1. This 
benefit of traditional banks relative to shadow banks is captured by the left-hand-side of (6). 
However, precisely because investors can get out early, the market can generate a larger amount of 
unstable short-term funding than of stable funding using a given asset as backing. This cost of 
traditional banking relative to shadow banks is captured by the right-hand-side of (6). In summary, 
                                                 
10 Implicitly, by requiring ߤ ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ, we are imposing a short-sale constraint for both traditional and shadow banks. 
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although traditional banks have more stable funding than shadow banks, this stability comes at a 
price: traditional banks create fewer money-like claims than shadow banks. 
Solving Eq. (6), the equilibrium fire-sale discount is 
* * (1 )( , ) .
(1 )
i i
i i i
i i
z p Fk k
F p F
    
 
   (7)
 Finally, inverting the ( , )i ik   function, the equilibrium fraction of asset i held by shadow banks is11 
* 1 (1 ) .
(1 )
i i
i i
i i
z p Fk
F p F
   
      
 (8) 
To take a simple parametric example, assume ( , ) 1i i i ik       . In this case, we have * 1i   if 
0i  —i.e., the asset is held exclusively by shadow banks if there is no fire-sale discount—and 
*
* 1 ( )1min ,1 min ,1 ,
(1 )
i i i
i
i i i i
k F z
F p F
    
           
 (9) 
if 0i  , so that * 0i   as .i   
The equilibrium in our model is in the spirit of Miller (1977). While the aggregate mix of 
unstable (i) versus stable funding (1–i) for each asset i is pinned down, in an interior equilibrium 
any small intermediary is indifferent between setting up shop as a bank or as a shadow bank. 
Relatedly, the model is silent about the boundaries of financial firms. In particular, a single 
institution—e.g., a universal-style bank with a broker-dealer affiliate—may wind up using both the 
traditional and shadow banking strategies. 
Eq. (6) says that the equilibrium fire-sale discount is locally independent of asset illiquidity i 
at an interior equilibrium where both traditional and shadow banks hold the asset. In this region, a 
change in asset illiquidity impacts the mix of asset holders—an increase in illiquidity raises the 
market share of banks—but leaves the fire-sale discount unchanged. However, if the assets are 
sufficiently liquid (i is very low), the market share of traditional banks is eventually driven to zero, 
so the fire-sale discount is increasing in asset illiquidity for very low levels of i.  
3.4. Comparative statics 
This simple model can be used to characterize the kinds of assets for which the traditional 
banking business model dominates. Two factors drive the tradeoff between traditional banks and 
                                                 
11 Formally, the function ݇௜ି ଵሺݔሻ is implicitly defined by ݔ ൌ ݇ሺ݇௜ି ଵሺݔሻ, ߮௜ሻ. 
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shadow banks: the premium for money-like claims which is controlled by  and the strength of the 
fire-sale effect which is controlled by i. 
First, if  = 0 and ( , ) / 0i i ik      , we have * 0i  —the risky asset is held entirely by 
traditional banks. If there is no premium for money-like claims, shadow banking is dominated by 
traditional banking: unstable short-term debt forces inefficient liquidations and has no offsetting 
monetary benefits relative to stable deposit funding.  
Conversely, if  > 0 and i = 0 so that ( ,0) 1ik    for all i, then * 1i  —the asset is held 
entirely by shadow banks. The advantage of traditional banks’ stable funding is that it enables them 
to ride out temporary departures of price from fundamental value without liquidating assets. Absent 
fire-sale risk, the price at time 1 always equals fundamental value and stable funding has no value; 
however, when  > 0, raising stable funding is always more costly than raising unstable funding.  
The ideal asset for a traditional bank has very little fundamental cash-flow risk (i.e., zi is high 
so risk-based capital rules allow a bank to use it to back a lot of money-like deposits) but is exposed 
to meaningful interim re-pricing risk (i.e., i is high so fire-sale risk looms large for its shadow bank 
counterparts). When both  > 0 and i > 0, there is a meaningful tradeoff between the two 
intermediation structures, and equilibrium is interior. 
For an interior equilibrium, we can ask how the equilibrium market shares of shadow banks  
( *i ) and traditional banks ( *1 i ) vary with the exogenous model parameters. Differentiating Eq. 
(8), we immediately obtain the following comparative statics for the fraction of an asset held by 
traditional banks: 
1. *(1 ) / 0i i     : An increase in asset illiquidity increases the equilibrium share held by 
traditional banks. By assumption, an increase in asset illiquidity makes the demand curve for 
fire-sale liquidations at time 1 steeper. Although a change in asset illiquidity i has no effect 
on the equilibrium level of the fire-sale discount in (7), this change alters the mapping 
between the ownership mix and the fire-sale discount in (8). When i is high, the fire-sale 
discount is highly sensitive to the volume of forced sales by shadow banks, so traditional 
banks end up holding more of the asset in equilibrium. 
2. *(1 ) / 0i iz    : An increase in the worst-case cash flow zi increases the share of the risky 
asset i held by traditional banks in equilibrium. An increase in zi reduces the money-creation 
advantage of shadow banks relative to traditional banks and therefore needs to be 
 18 
 
compensated by a rise in *ik  which implies a rise in *1 i  to restore equilibrium indifference 
between traditional and shadow banks. Since a higher zi reflects lower fundamental cash-flow 
risk, all else equal, traditional banks have a comparative advantage at holding assets with 
lower fundamental cash-flow risk. 
Taken together, these two results suggest that traditional banks have a comparative 
advantage at holding illiquid fixed-income assets—i.e., assets that may experience significant 
temporary price dislocations but at the same time have only modest fundamental risk. Agency MBS 
might be a leading example of such an asset, because they are insured against default risk but are 
considerably less liquid than Treasury securities, and, for a given duration, have more price volatility, 
because there is significant variability in the MBS-Treasury spread. 
The model also explains why banks are not well-suited to investing in equities—equities have 
too much fundamental downside risk. Because their value can fall very far over an extended period of 
time—i.e., because their zi is close to zero—equities cannot be efficiently used as backing for safe 
two-period claims. One reflection of this fact is that when banks do hold equities, they face 
prohibitively high regulatory capital requirements.12 In contrast, to the extent that they are highly 
liquid, equities do make suitable collateral for very short-term repo financing and can be used to back 
some amount of shadow bank money.  
What happens as the underlying asset grows increasingly safe and liquid, itself becoming 
nearly money-like? In practice, this corresponds to asking who will hold short-term Treasury bills. In 
this limiting case, both the benefits and the costs in Eq. (6) vanish, so in our model the mix between 
traditional and shadow banks is indeterminate. However, this mix would be pinned down if we 
introduced a small overhead cost of traditional banking that scaled with assets under management, 
such as a cost of regulatory compliance. In this case, we would expect a nonbank vehicle such as a 
money market fund to hold the vast majority of T-bills. 
In addition, we have the following comparative statics which impact all assets: 
3. *(1 ) / 0i     : An increase in the premium on safe money-like claims lowers traditional 
banks’ equilibrium market share of all risky assets. When the premium associated with safe 
                                                 
12 US banks are currently required to finance any common stock holdings with at least 24% of loss-absorbing capital. The 
corresponding capital requirements for commercial loans and residential mortgages are 8% and 4%, respectively. 
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money-like claims is higher, the fire-sale discount must rise to maintain equilibrium (i.e., *ik  
must fall), so the fraction of risky assets held by shadow banks, *i , must rise. 
4. *(1 ) / 0i p    : An increase in the probability of good news at time 1 lowers the share of 
all risky assets held by traditional banks. When the interim good state is more likely, a larger 
fire-sale discount (lower *ik ) is needed to restore indifference, and the market share of shadow 
banks, *i , must rise in equilibrium. Intuitively, the bank’s stable funding structure functions 
as a costly form of insurance against fire-sale risk; this insurance naturally becomes less 
valuable when a fire sale is less likely (i.e., when p rises). 
Comparative static #3 suggests that an increase in the demand for safe money-like assets 
should trigger a migration of intermediation from traditional to shadow banking. Indeed, some 
observers have argued that such an increase in money demand played a role in fueling the rapid 
growth of shadow banking prior to the recent financial crisis. Comparative static #4 suggests that 
intermediation activity tends to migrate from traditional banks towards shadow banks during 
economic expansions when p is high. In this way, the model explains why traditional banks lost 
significant market share to shadow banks during the run-up to the recent financial crisis. 
3.5. Model extensions 
We have deliberately kept the model quite spare. First, we have assumed that the demand for 
safe money-like claims is infinitely elastic and hence never satiated (i.e., households have linear 
utility over money-like asset holdings). In a more general model, the demand for money-like claims 
would be downward-sloping (corresponding to concave utility over safe money-like claims), so the 
liquidity premium would decline with the total quantity of money-like claims provided by 
intermediaries. We can extend our model to allow the liquidity premium to be determined this way in 
equilibrium. Holding fixed the equilibrium money premium, our key results on the cross-section of 
risky assets still obtain: traditional banks hold a larger share of more illiquid assets and of assets with 
less fundamental risk. 
We have also implicitly assumed that, to the extent it is technologically feasible, 
intermediaries use all risky assets as fodder for backing money-like claims. One might extend the 
model so that some risky assets are not used to back money-like claims and instead are held directly 
by households in equilibrium. For some risky assets to not be used as fodder for backing safe money-
like claims, we would need to add an overhead cost of traditional banking as in DeAngelo and Stulz 
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(2015). Going further, we could add assets like Treasury bills that are perfectly safe even in the 
absence of any tranching by financial intermediaries. As explored in Greenwood, Hanson, and Stein 
(2015) and Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2015), with downward-sloping demand for 
money-like assets, changes in the supply of T-bills would depress the premium on money-like claims, 
reducing the incentive of shadow banks and traditional banks to bear the fire-sale and overhead costs 
incurred in intermediation. 
3.6. Discussion 
While banks’ asset holdings are the most noteworthy complement to their stable funding 
structures, our model may help shed light on other aspects of commercial banks’ modern business 
model. Consider, for example, the bricks-and-mortar costs associated with bank deposit-taking. We 
have estimated these costs to be quite high, averaging on the order of 1.30 percent of deposits over 
the period from 1984 to 2012. These costs ultimately represent a choice—banks could always choose 
to offer their customers fewer and less attractive branch locations, fewer opportunities for interacting 
with a human teller, and so forth. One view is that these amenities are a separable flow of services to 
depositors, conceptually analogous to paying more interest. However, an interesting alternative is that 
they represent a deliberate effort to build loyalty by creating a form of switching costs. Investing in 
such switching costs and thereby increasing deposit stickiness is complementary to an overall 
business model based on the premise of having stable funding. By contrast, a money market fund 
complex—which also takes deposits, but which invests exclusively in short-term assets—has less 
reason to care about deposit stickiness and hence less incentive to spend on a branch network. 
The model may also have something to say about the contrasting accounting practices of 
commercial banks and the institutions that play a crucial role in the shadow banking system: money 
market funds, broker-dealers, and hedge funds. These market-based institutions typically lack access 
to stable short-term funding and operate on a mark-to-market accounting basis. Even if a decline in 
security prices is temporary and driven by nonfundamental factors, it impacts their accounting 
earnings. In contrast, accounting conventions for banks shield their earnings from transitory changes 
in the unrealized market value of loans or securities. These “temporary impairments” flow through 
another liability account called “accumulated other comprehensive income” and only impact reported 
earnings if the gains or losses are realized by selling the security. If movements in asset prices are 
driven entirely by fundamental news about future cash flows, then commercial banks’ accounting 
practices seem perplexing. However, to the extent that asset price movements are driven by 
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nonfundamental shocks which the banks’ stable funding structure enables them to ride out, these 
accounting practices may be sensible (see also Cochrane, 2011). 
 
4. Commercial banks in historical perspective 
Our model sheds light on the significant shifts in commercial banks’ business model over the 
last 150 years. Our central prediction is the complementarity between the three features of modern 
commercial banking: deposit insurance, stable funding, and investment in long-term fixed-income 
assets that are nonetheless subject to price fluctuations. It is therefore natural to ask what commercial 
banking in the US looked like before the introduction of deposit insurance. The model predicts, not 
surprisingly, that bank funding was less stable.  Perhaps more surprisingly, the model also predicts 
that bank assets prior to deposit insurance would have needed to be shorter-term and easier to 
liquidate without losses. The evidence presented below is strikingly consistent with this prediction. 
Indeed, during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, US commercial banks employed a business 
model similar to the strategy we have called “shadow banking.” 
During the National Banking Era from 1865–1914, nationally chartered banks were financed 
with demand deposits (68% on average during this period), national bank notes (8%), and equity 
(24%). While commercial banks were heavily reliant on deposit funding just as they are today, they 
held very different assets.13 Without deposit insurance, the banking system regularly faced mass 
depositor withdrawals, and the prevailing philosophy—enshrined in both the National Banking Act of 
1864 and the Federal Reserve Act of 1913—“emphasized the importance of keeping bank assets 
liquid by (largely) confining the use of bank funds to short-term loans” (Moulton, 1918, p. 638). 
To begin, national banks held far more cash and interbank deposits than they do today. On 
average, cash items accounted for 27% of assets from 1865 to 1914 versus less than 4% for 
commercial banks prior to the 2008–2009 crisis.14  Banks’ loan portfolios (averaging 55% of assets) 
were concentrated in short-term loans to finance working capital or short-term collateralized loans. 
Finally, from 1865 to 1914, securities comprised 17% of bank assets. Banks’ securities were 
                                                 
13National bank notes—a form of legal paper money backed by banks’ holdings of certain US Treasury securities—were 
a major liability item for national banks during the beginning of the era. 
14 Legal reserve requirements were far higher—reserve requirements on all deposits were 15% for country banks and 25% 
for city banks. Today, reserve requirements are 10% on transaction accounts, which account for only 12% of total 
deposits. However, according to Myers (1931), reserve requirements were not binding: most state-chartered banks had 
voluntarily held similar levels of reserves prior to the passage of the National Banking Act. 
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concentrated in Treasuries, state and local bonds, and railroad bonds—all “of high grade as to both 
security and marketability” (Moulton, 1918, p. 711). 
Banks primarily made short-term “commercial loans” to finance working capital that were 
“automatically self-liquidating,” while avoiding illiquid longer term “industrial loans” to finance 
permanent capital (Myers, 1931; White, 1998). The Comptroller of the Currency bluntly summarized 
this view in 1876: “Banks are not loan offices. It is not part of their business to furnish their 
customers with capital” (Bolles, 1890, p. 70). Prior to 1913, national banks were prohibited from 
making real estate loans because “deposits payable on demand should not be invested in real estate 
financing” Pollock (1993).15 The principal lending instruments included loans secured by short-term 
trade receivables or “trade acceptances” (similar to factoring), short-term unsecured working capital 
loans or “commercial paper,” overnight margin loans collateralized by stocks and bonds or “call 
loans,” and other short-term, collateralized loans. Banks typically rolled over these short-term loans 
in normal times (Moulton, 1918).16 
In 1896, 20% of all loans by national banks were due on demand, primarily in the form of call 
loans backed by stocks and bonds (Statistical Abstracts of the US, 1896, Table 28). Trade 
acceptances and commercial paper were also quite short-term. James (1978) argues that the 
maturities of these loans typically ranged from 30 to 90 days, with an average maturity of 60 days 
and an upper bound of one year. Furthermore, the banks in major cities, which faced the greatest risk 
of withdrawal by depositors, tended to hold shorter-term paper than country banks whose deposits 
were somewhat more sticky (Myers, 1931).17 Commercial banks’ maturity mismatch and liquidity 
mismatch were far more limited than they would become after the introduction of deposit insurance 
in 1933 (White, 1998). 
Furthermore, there were telling differences between national banks, which were largely 
financed with demand deposits, and state banks, which were more reliant on savings and time 
                                                 
15 The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 loosened this restriction somewhat, allowing national banks to make loans secured by 
farmland, provided that they were limited to a 50% loan-to-value ratio and maturities of less than five years. However, 
real estate loans were limited to the greater of 25% of a bank’s capital or 33% of its time deposits. In 1916, national banks 
were permitted to make one-year loans secured by urban real estate. These limits on real estate lending were gradually 
relaxed and were eliminated with the Garn-St. German Act of 1982. 
16 To ensure they were not financing permanent capital, banks subjected borrowers to an annual “clean up,” requiring 
them to briefly repay all debts, perhaps by borrowing from another bank (Moulton, 1918; White, 1998). 
17 For instance, while loans due on demand were 12% of the loan portfolios of country banks, they represented 35% of 
loans for banks in New York City. (Statistical Abstracts of the US, 1896, Table 28). 
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deposits.18 While state banks made short-term commercial loans, they made some longer-term real 
estate loans as well. Under state regulations, the amount of real estate loans was tied to amount of 
time deposits or equity capital (White, 1998). According to Pollock (1993), “real estate loans, which 
represent, by definition, illiquid underlying assets, should be explicitly tied to less liquid bank 
liabilities.” Finally, “mutual savings banks” specialized in longer-term real estate loans, but were 
entirely financed by equity and savings deposits subject to withdrawal limitations. 
During the recurring financial crises of this era—there were major banking panics in 1873, 
1884, 1893, 1890, 1896, 1907, and 1914 (Calomiris and Gorton, 1991)—banks faced significant 
withdrawals from individual depositors. For instance, during the severe panics of 1873 and 1893, 
deposits at national banks shrank by 16% and 17%, respectively, over the course of several months. 
These withdrawals were met, in part, by drawing down excess reserves, but also by calling in loans 
due on demand and declining to roll over maturing time loans (Sprague, 1910; Myers, 1931; 
Friedman and Schwartz, 1963). In 1873 and 1893, total loans extended by national banks shrank by 
17% and 15%, respectively. Consistent with an inward shift in loan supply, crises were typically 
marked by large spikes in interest rates—call loan rates often rose by ten or more percentage points 
with commercial paper rates rising by three or more percentage points (Sprague, 1910; Champ, 
2007).19 Because country banks typically drew down balances they held at city banks, these loan 
“liquidations” were often most pronounced at city banks, particularly New York City banks. In the 
Panic of 1873, loans extended by New York City banks shrank by 41%.  
These loan liquidations were similar to the fire-sale mechanism in our paper. The closest 
analog lies in the call loans secured by stocks and bonds. The forced sales triggered by reductions in 
margin lending were widely thought to have exacerbated the declines in stock and bond prices in 
many of the era’s financial crises, including the 1929 crash (Sprague, 1910; Moen and Tallman, 
1990; Galbraith, 1954; and Meltzer, 2002). The inevitable post-crisis decline in real activity was 
often attributed, in part, to the forced liquidation of commercial loans used to finance working 
capital. Moulton (1918, pp. 719-720) recognizes the costs of these liquidations, writing: 
                                                 
18 In part, this was because national banks faced the same reserve requirement on all deposit types. By contrast, state 
banks typically faced lower reserve requirements for time and savings deposits (White, 1998). 
19 The behavior of commercial bank deposits and lending during crisis periods in the late 19th and early 20th centuries 
stands in sharp contrast to the behavior of today’s insured commercial banks. In more recent times, insured bank deposits 
have often benefitted from safe-haven inflows during crisis periods. Furthermore, there is often an expansion in 
outstanding bank loans during periods of financial strain as existing loan commitments are drawn down (Kashyap, Rajan, 
and Stein, 2002; Gatev and Strahan, 2006; Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010). 
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“Loans to [meat]packers had always been considered extremely liquid, and when, in 1907, 
the Chicago banks were desirous of replenishing their reserves they asked Mr. Armour to 
liquidate his loans … Now it is true that any particular packing-house note is liquid. It will be 
paid whenever a bank desires—even before maturity ... But such payments are largely 
effected through a shifting process, for the loan from bank A that is paid promptly reappears 
as a loan from bank B … But while any particular [meat]packing-house loan is thus liquid, it 
is an entirely different matter when it comes to liquidating all of them at once. Banks … 
furnish permanent working capital to the [meat]packers, and it would be impossible for the 
packing-houses to liquidate all their loans without disrupting the entire live-stock industry.” 
Importantly, the ubiquity of short-term bank loans during this era does not appear to stem 
from a lack of demand for long-term credit. According to Myers (1931, p. 45), “attempts on the part 
of a bank to confine its loans to short-term paper were often bitterly resented by the community.” To 
the extent that state governments or corporations (e.g., railroads) needed access to long-term 
financing, they had to sell stocks or bonds (Moulton, 1918; White, 1998). Stocks and bonds were 
often bought by foreign investors (Myers, 1931) or domestically by life insurers who had long-term 
sticky liabilities (White, 1998).  Interestingly, there was a thriving original issue high-yield bond 
market in the first several decades of the 20th century, many decades before Michael Milken 
(Greenwood and Hanson, 2013). A plausible hypothesis is that the junk bond market flourished 
precisely because banks were unable to supply longer-term loans to commercial borrowers. 
After the introduction of federal deposit insurance in 1933, one of the major policy goals was 
to encourage banks to make longer-term and effectively more illiquid loans. Specifically, bank 
regulators were asked not to “criticize” long-term commercial loans and national banks were given 
much greater latitude to make real estate loans starting in 1934 (White, 1998). It appears that 
policymakers were concerned that the kind of short-term bank lending that dominated prior to the 
introduction of deposit insurance had imposed a sort of credit-crunch externality on the real economy, 
making economy-wide downturns more severe because firms were forced to prematurely liquidate 
real projects to pay off short-term bank loans. 
In summary, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the deposits of US commercial banks 
were kept safe and liquid by largely restricting bank assets to cash and very short-term loans—i.e., by 
limiting the liquidity mismatch between assets and liabilities. What we have termed the “traditional 
banking” strategy—a buy-and-hold approach that uses long-term, illiquid assets to back short-term 
deposits—is best seen as a mid-20th century development that was made possible by the introduction 
of a reliable lender of last resort and federal deposit insurance. 
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5. Contemporary evidence 
In this section, we provide some contemporary aggregate evidence bearing on the model’s 
predictions. We first describe how we take the model to the data, then our measurement approach, 
and finally, the results of some simple cross-sectional regressions suggested by the model. 
5.1. Taking the model to the data 
5.1.1. The cross-section of asset classes 
A key testable implication of our model is that, all else equal, traditional banks should hold a 
higher market share in more illiquid assets: *(1 ) / 0i i     .  
Prediction 1: Looking across assets and holding constant fundamental asset risk, banks 
should have a larger market share in asset classes that are more illiquid. 
 Our model features just two intermediary types: traditional banks with stable funding and 
shadow banks with unstable funding. In reality, there are many intermediary types with a range of 
funding stability. Generalizing our theory, we would expect intermediaries with more stable funding 
to hold more illiquid assets with high fire-sale risk. 
Prediction 2: Looking across assets and holding constant fundamental asset risk, more 
illiquid asset classes should be held by intermediary types with greater funding stability. 
5.1.2. The cross-section of intermediary types 
Since our theory has predictions for the cross-section of asset types, it naturally generates 
related predictions for the cross-section of intermediary types. Specifically, the portfolio share of 
shadow banks in asset i is 
*
*
*
1
,S i ii N
k kk
Qw
Q


   (10)
 and the portfolio share of traditional banks in asset i is 
*
*
*
1
(1 ) .
(1 )
B i i
i N
k kk
Qw
Q


   (11) 
It follows trivially from the comparative statics derived above that * / 0Si iw    , * / 0,Si iw z    
* / 0Bi iw    , and * / 0.Bi iw z    In other words, shadow bank portfolios are tilted towards assets 
that are more liquid or have more fundamental downside-risk, whereas traditional bank portfolios are 
tilted towards assets that are more illiquid and have less fundamental downside-risk.  
The average illiquidity of assets held by shadow banks is 
 26 
 
* *
1
,NS Si ii w    (12)
 
and the average illiquidity of assets held by commercial banks is 
* *
1
.NB Bi ii w    (13)
 
If all assets have the same zi, in equilibrium we have 
* *.B S   (14)
 
That is, the asset portfolios of traditional banks should be more illiquid than those of shadow banks. 
Prediction 3: The asset portfolios of commercial banks are more illiquid than the asset 
portfolios of shadow banks, controlling for fundamental risk. 
As above, we can generalize this to obtain a prediction that we can apply to the broader cross-
section of intermediary types, including insurers and finance companies. 
Prediction 4: Comparing across intermediaries, those with more stable funding should have 
asset portfolios that are more illiquid, controlling for fundamental risk. 
5.2. Measurement 
Let j index intermediary types, and let i index instrument types—i.e., different types of assets 
or liabilities. Let [0,1]iILLIQUID   measure the illiquidity of asset type i. For instance, US 
Treasuries should have ILLIQUIDi = 0, and small business loans might have ILLIQUIDi = 1. 
Similarly, let [0,1]iMATURITY   measure the contractual maturity length of liability type i and 
[0,1]iSTICKY   measure the stickiness of liability type i. Stickiness is the opposite of runniness, 
which is the tendency for liability holders to withdraw funds following an adverse shock. For 
instance, short-term commercial paper might have STICKYi = 0, while long-term (nonredeemable) 
equity would have STICKYi = 1. 
Let Aji and Lji denote intermediary j’s assets and liabilities of instrument type i and let 
j ji jii i
A A L    denote the total assets of intermediary type j. Then the Asset Illiquidity Index 
for intermediary type j is defined as the weighted average illiquidity of its asset holdings 
_ .ji iij
j
A ILLIQUID
A ILLIQUID
A
   (15)
 The Liability Maturity Index for intermediary type j is the weighted average contractual maturity of 
its liabilities 
_ .ij iij
j
L MATURITY
L MATURITY
A
   (16)
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Finally, the Liability Stickiness Index for intermediary type j is the weighted average stickiness of its 
liabilities 
_ .ji iij
j
L STICKY
L STICKY
A
   (17)
  Our measurement approach is in the spirit of Brunnermeier, Gorton, and Krishnamurthy 
(2014), who suggest constructing a liquidity mismatch index—the difference between asset illiquidity 
and funding liquidity—for different financial intermediaries. This approach is implemented in Bai, 
Krishnamurthy, and Weymuller (2015) for bank holding companies.  
We assemble data on the assets and liabilities of various types of financial intermediaries 
using the Federal Reserve’s Financial Accounts of the United States (formerly the Flow of Funds 
Accounts). We examine data on commercial banks, property and casualty (P&C) insurers, life 
insurers, money market funds (MMFs), government sponsored enterprises (GSEs), finance 
companies, real estate investment trusts (REITs), and security broker-dealers. We use data on 
intermediary balance sheets as of 2012Q4. However, the findings of our analysis do not depend 
significantly on when we look at the data. 
 In an effort to avoid subjective judgments, wherever possible we assign numerical values for 
ILLIQUIDj, MATURITYj, and STICKYj based on the bank liquidity requirements recently put forth 
under Basel III Accord. (To be clear, these new liquidity requirements are distinct from the more 
familiar risk-based capital requirements.) Specifically, for each instrument type, we attempt to 
choose values of these parameters based on the proposed calibration of Basel III’s Net Stable 
Funding Requirement (NSFR) in Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010) and the final 
calibration of the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) in Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(2013), hereafter BCBS (2010 and 2013). However, we do need to apply some judgment in mapping 
the instrument types considered by Basel III to our aggregated Financial Accounts data. We also need 
to assign values for liability types issued by nonbanks that are not considered by BCBS. As we detail 
in the Internet Appendix, we have made every attempt to do so in the spirit of BCBS (2010 and 2013) 
and consistent with empirical evidence. The most important auxiliary assumption we make is that the 
policy liabilities of life insurers are quite sticky, whereas those of P&C insurers are less sticky.20 
                                                 
20 See Bai, Krishnamurthy, and Weymuller (2013) for a similar, albeit more sophisticated, approach that requires more 
granular balance sheet data than is available in the Financial Accounts. Specifically, they use measures of asset illiquidity 
based on repo haircuts. 
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 Consider first our ILLIQUID index for assets. We associate ILLIQUID with the parameter i 
in the model. We assign ILLIQUID = 0 for US Treasuries, ILLIQUID = 0.15 for GSE-backed MBS, 
ILLIQUID = 0.5 for corporate equities, ILLIQUID = 0.75 for consumer debt and home mortgages, 
and ILLIQUID = 1 for unsecured commercial and industrial (C&I) and secured commercial real 
estate (CRE) loans. 
Next, consider our STICKY and MATURITY indices for liabilities. Starting with bank 
deposits, we assign STICKY = 0.7 and MATURITY = 0.1 for wholesale bank deposits, STICKY = 0.8 
and MATURITY = 0 for retail time and savings deposits, and STICKY = 0.9 and MATURITY = 0 for 
transactions deposits. Turning to nondeposit liabilities, we assign STICKY = 0.6 and  
MATURITY = 0.6 for corporate bonds and STICKY = 0 and MATURITY = 0 for nondeposit, short-
term funding. For insurance policy liabilities, we assume STICKY = MATURITY = 0.9 for life policies 
and STICKY = MATURITY = 0.6 for P&C policies. 
5.3. Empirical tests 
5.3.1. The cross-section of asset classes 
Prediction 1 says that traditional banks should hold a higher market share in more illiquid 
assets. A simple way to assess this prediction is to compute banks’ market share for each asset type 
,_ / .i jibank i jBANK SHR A A   (18)
 In other words, for each asset type, we compute banks’ share of the total amount of assets held by 
financial intermediaries.21 Since BANK_SHRi corresponds precisely to (1–i) in the model, and 
ILLIQUIDi corresponds to i, we should see a strong positive relationship between BANK_SHRi on 
ILLIQUIDi in the cross-section of asset types. 
[Insert Fig. 3 about here] 
Panel A of Fig. 3 shows the result. The estimated regression is 
2
( 3.47)
_ 0.04 0. ,   0. 757 4 .i itBANK SHR ILLIQUID R     (19)
 As predicted, there is a strong positive relationship between asset illiquidity and banks’ market share. 
Of course, this is just a descriptive cross-sectional regression with 12 observations. It is also a 
univariate regression, whereas our theory suggests a bivariate relationship: banks’ market share of a 
                                                 
21 Specifically, we compute the share of assets held by the Financial Business sector in Table L.107 of the Financial 
Accounts that is attributable to US-Chartered Depository Institutions in Table L.110. 
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given asset should depend on both the asset’s illiquidity and its fundamental safety. If the two 
characteristics are correlated—as they likely are—then (19) suffers from an omitted variable bias. To 
address this concern, we run a multivariate regression of banks’ market share on asset illiquidity and 
fundamental safety, expecting positive coefficients on both. To run this multivariate regression, we 
create a new variable called FUNDSAFE, which we set equal to negative one times the risk-weight 
under current US risk-based capital regulations.22 While this is solely meant to be illustrative, this 
approach yields 
2
( 4.87) ( 5.41)
_ ,   0.730.14 0.68 0.16 .i i it tBANK SHR ILLIQUID FUNDSAFE R       (20)
 The coefficient on ILLIQUIDi is larger in the multivariate regression and the R
2 rises considerably. 
Another crude way to address this omitted variable bias is to run a univariate regression of banks’ 
market share on illiquidity alone, dropping those asset classes with significantly greater fundamental 
cash-flow risk. For instance, if we drop equity-like instruments (corporate equities and mutual fund 
shares), the R2 in the univariate regression rises from 0.47 to 0.59. 
Turning to Prediction 2, other intermediaries besides traditional banks may also have stable 
funding and thus may also have a comparative advantage at holding illiquid assets. To capture this, 
we compute the average funding stability of holders of a given asset as 
_
_ .
ji jj
i
jij
A L STICKY
AV STICKY
A
    (21) 
Because AV_STICKYi is a generalized version of (1–i) in the model, and ILLIQUIDi corresponds to 
i, Prediction 2 suggests that we should observe a strong positive relationship between the two in the 
cross-section. This is shown in Panel B of Fig. 3, where we plot AV_STICKYi versus ILLIQUIDi . The 
estimated regression is given by 
2
( 3.40)
0.59 0.23_ ,   0.41.i itAV STICKY ILLIQUID R     (22)
 Again, we see a strong positive relationship. The R
2 of this regression rises from 0.41 to 0.64 if we 
exclude corporate equities and mutual fund shares. 
Fig. 3 confirms the core message of our model. Banks hold virtually no Treasuries despite 
their extreme safety. Treasuries are not exposed to interim fire-sale risk, so they are not profitable 
enough for banks. By contrast, banks are significant holders of GSE-backed MBS. These securities 
                                                 
22 See https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/capital/Community_Bank_Guide_Expanded.pdf for current risk weights.  
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have limited downside-risk, so banks can use them to back nearly as much money-like short-term 
debt as a shadow bank. At the same time, GSE-backed MBS are more exposed to fire-sale risk than 
Treasuries, which makes them more attractive to traditional banks. 
Fig. 3 also shows that banks have a dominant market share in illiquid home mortgage loans, 
holding approximately 76% of unsecuritized whole loans. Banks are also the largest holders of 
illiquid commercial and multi-family home mortgages. Going beyond Fig. 3, even within the 
category of home mortgages, banks tend to hold less “plain-vanilla” products, for which liquidation 
costs are likely higher. Specifically, banks are the dominant holders of second-lien home equity loans 
and other mortgage products falling outside of the conventional mortgage markets supported by the 
GSEs.23  
Finally, Fig. 3 shows that banks remain significant holders of unsecured loans to firms, 
holding 48% of all C&I loans. As with home mortgages, when one looks within the category of C&I 
loans, banks seem to specialize in those that are the most illiquid. For instance, banks have been 
steadily losing market share in the market for C&I loans to large firms, which has become 
increasingly liquid in recent decades. At the same time, banks remain the near exclusive providers of 
C&I loans to small- and medium-sized firms, which continue to be highly illiquid. According to the 
2012Q4 Financial Accounts, banks hold 37% of C&I loans to nonfinancial corporations, but 86% of 
C&I loans to nonfinancial noncorporate businesses, which tend to be much smaller. 
5.3.2. The cross-section of intermediary types 
Prediction 4 suggests that in the cross-section of intermediary types we should see a strong 
positive relationship between A_ILLIQUIDj and L_STICKYj. Because the stickiness of liabilities as 
opposed to their contractual maturity is the key to avoiding costly liquidations, we expect to see a 
weaker relationship between A_ILLIQUIDj and L_MATURITYj. In particular, we expect traditional 
banks to look like an extreme outlier in this regard because their assets are highly illiquid given the 
short contractual maturity of their liabilities. 
[Insert Fig. 4 about here] 
Panel A of Fig. 4 plots A_ILLIQUIDj versus L_STICKYj. As predicted by the theory, we see a 
strong positive relationship and the estimated regression is 
                                                 
23 For instance, according to the Financial Accounts, commercial banks held 85% of the $750 billion in second-lien home 
mortgage loans as of 2012Q4. 
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2
( 5.02)
0.13 0.55_ _ ,   0.64.j jtA ILLIQUID STICKY RL     (23)
 Panel B of Fig. 4 plots A_ILLIQUIDj versus L_MATURITYj. The estimated regression is 
2
( 1.59)
0.27 0.3_ _ ,   0 9.6 .2j jtA ILLI LQUID MATURITY R     (24)
 So, as expected, the regression fit deteriorates significantly from Panel A to Panel B. Although there 
is a general tendency for intermediaries with longer maturity liabilities to hold more illiquid assets, 
banks are a significant outlier. Relative to other patient investors, who obtain stable funding by 
issuing liabilities with long contractual maturities, banks issue short-term liabilities but organize 
themselves in such a way that their contractually short-term deposits are de facto extremely stable. 
5.4. Related micro evidence 
While we have focused on the aggregate structure of financial intermediation, the banking 
literature contains some complementary micro evidence consistent with our theory. Using the Survey 
of Terms of Business Lending, Berlin and Mester (1999) find that, in the cross-section of banks, 
those with greater access to sticky “core” deposits (i.e., transaction and saving deposits) are more 
likely to form stable lending relationships with firms, providing borrowers with insurance against 
transitory market shocks. Black, Hancock, and Passmore (2007, 2010) find that banks with a large 
supply of core deposits tend to specialize in more illiquid information-intensive loans, whereas banks 
which are more reliant on wholesale funding tend to specialize in easy-to-value loans.24  
 
6. Optimal haircuts 
A central set of issues in current discussions of financial regulation concerns the migration of 
intermediation activity from the traditional banking sector to the shadow banking sector. In our 
model, shadow banking creates negative externalities because the social costs of fire sales exceed the 
private costs. This is the case because the ability of shadow banks to create money-like claims is 
constrained by the time-1 liquidation value of their collateral. An intermediary that switches from 
traditional to shadow banking fails to internalize how this switch reduces liquidation prices and thus 
the feasible amount of money creation by other shadow banks. 
                                                 
24 Black, Hancock, and Passmore (2007) show that there is strong positive association between core deposit-taking and 
small business lending, while Black, Hancock, and Passmore (2010) find a similar connection between core deposits and 
information-intensive (i.e., subprime) mortgage lending. 
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If it is also possible to create some private money via traditional banking (i.e., if zi >0), the 
equilibrium size of the shadow banking sector is too large and the traditional banking sector is too 
small, as compared to the social optimum. The social optimum may be restored using a set of 
minimum required haircuts on shadow banks, which pushes money creation back towards traditional 
banks. These regulatory haircuts are effectively an extra capital requirement that the shadow banking 
sector must set aside when raising short-term funding against risky assets, above and beyond what the 
private sector demands to make the short-term claims safe. An additional haircut of hi only allows 
shadow banks to create ( )i i i i ik h F k F   of safe money-like claims using the risky asset i as 
collateral. These haircuts function as a Pigouvian tax on the fire-sale externality associated with the 
shadow banking sector.  
In the Internet Appendix, we show that if there are no social costs associated with the 
provision of government deposit insurance, these optimal shadow banking haircuts, given by **ih , 
have a simple and intuitive form: 
** ( ) 0
( )
.
1
i i
i
i i
h z
F
 
    (25)
 Here, ( )i   denotes the elasticity of the fire-sale discount with respect to liquidation volume which is 
an increasing function of asset illiquidity i. Optimal haircuts depend on two factors. First, the 
required haircut is higher for more illiquid assets. This is natural since ( )i   captures the severity of 
the fire-sale externality and the strength of the over-migration tendency. Second, the optimal haircut 
is higher for assets with high values of zi, namely, those with less fundamental risk. These are the 
assets with which traditional banks’ stable, hold-to-maturity strategy can create the most monetary 
services. If traditional banking does not create any uninternalized costs, one wants to lean most 
aggressively against shadow banking in cases where traditional banks provide an efficient 
alternative.25 
Of course, traditional banking also gives rise to costs that are not fully internalized. Since 
bank capital is completely wiped out in the disaster state of the world, creating safe bank deposits 
inevitably exposes taxpayers to some tail risk. This exposure is socially costly to the extent that 
                                                 
25 For example, our model implies that ݄௜∗∗ ൌ 0 for equity-like assets where zi = 0—in other words, there is no need for 
regulation in this case. This is because when zi = 0, shadow banking is the only technology for creating money-like 
claims, so there is no scope for over-migration. However, when zi > 0, there is also a stable banking technology (which is 
socially costless by assumption) to migrate away from. 
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deposit insurance creates moral hazard problems, government fiscal capacity is limited (Stavrakeva, 
2013), or banks do not fully understand tail risks (Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny, 2012, 2013). 
In the Internet Appendix we assume that these insurance payouts are financed by distortionary 
taxes which create deadweight social losses. In this case, the optimal haircut in (25) is reduced by a 
term that reflects the marginal fiscal cost of relying on taxpayer-financed deposit insurance. This cost 
is greater when the disaster state is more likely, when the scale of the resulting bailout is larger (i.e., 
when the traditional banking system is larger), and when a given amount of taxation creates greater 
deadweight losses. 
 
7. Conclusion 
The specialness of traditional banks comes from combining stable money creation on the 
liability side with assets that have relatively low-risk, long-run cash flows but possibly volatile 
market values and limited liquidity. To make this business model work, banks rely on deposit 
insurance and hold substantial equity capital. 
Some preliminary evidence is consistent with the model’s predictions. Historically, prior to 
the introduction of deposit insurance, US commercial banks relied on deposits as their primary source 
of funding—just as they do today—but invested in assets that were much shorter-term and less 
volatile than they do now. The change in the structure of bank assets, and not just in the stability of 
their deposits, as a result of deposit insurance, is a distinctive prediction of our model. 
In the cross-section of fixed-income assets, the most illiquid assets have the highest share held 
by commercial banks. As the model predicts, banks specialize in holding relatively low-risk fixed-
income assets but are not afraid of illiquidity. In a cross-section of financial intermediary types, 
intermediaries with stickier liabilities hold less liquid assets. Banks, in particular, appear as having 
extremely sticky liabilities as well as very illiquid assets. More casual evidence, such as the near 
absence of both Treasuries and equities in bank asset portfolios, also supports our view. 
One key message of the paper is that the structure of financial intermediation may be shaped 
in important ways by the nonfundamental movements in asset prices—due to fire sales, noise trading, 
slow-moving capital, and other frictions—that have been extensively documented in the asset-pricing 
literature. Specifically, one central role of intermediaries—and of banks in particular—is to act as a 
bridge between households who want to put their money in a safe place that they do not need to 
watch, and securities markets where even assets with relatively low fundamental risk can have 
volatile market prices.  
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Panel A: Bank liability composition 
 
 
Panel B: Bank asset composition 
 
 
Fig. 1: Data on US commercial bank balance sheets, 1896–2012. This figure shows the evolution of 
the aggregate balance sheet of US commercial banks from 1896 to 2012. All figures are in book 
terms and are scaled by total assets. The series for 1896–1918 are based on data for “all banks” 
from All Bank Statistics, United States, 1896–1955 (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, 1959). The series for 1919–1933 are based on Federal Reserve member banks from 
Banking and Monetary Statistics, 1919–1941 (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
1943). The series for 1934–2012 are based on all insured commercial banks from the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (FDIC) Historical Statistics on Banking available at 
http://www2.fdic.gov/hsob/.    
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Panel A: Value-weighted averages for all banks 
 
 
Panel B: Value-weighted averages for highly capitalized banks 
 
 
Fig. 2: Composition of bank securities portfolios, 1994–2012. This figure shows the composition of 
bank securities portfolios based on data from the Call Reports. We report bank holdings of various 
security types as a fraction of total bank investment securities (this excludes trading account assets). 
We restrict attention to banks with assets greater than $1 billion. Panel A shows the value-weighted 
average securities portfolio for all banks. Panel B shows the securities portfolio of banks whose 
equity-to-assets ratio exceeds the industry median. 
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Panel A: The market share of commercial banks versus asset illiquidity 
 
Panel B: The average liability stickiness of asset holders versus asset illiquidity 
 
 
Fig. 3: The cross-section of asset classes. Panel A plots BANK_SHRi versus ILLIQUIDi for major 
financial asset classes. Panel B plots AV_STICKYi verus ILLIQUIDi. The figures are based on data 
from the Financial Accounts of the United States as of 2012Q4 and information contained in BCBS 
(2010 and 2013). See the Internet Appendix for further details.  
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Panel A: Intermediary asset illiquidity versus liability stickiness 
 
Panel B: Intermediary asset illiquidity versus liability contractual maturity 
 
 
Fig. 4: The cross-section of intermediary types. Panel A plots A_ILLIQUIDj versus L_STICKYj for 
different intermediary types. Panel B plots A_ILLIQUIDj versus L_MATURITYj. The figures are 
based on data from the Financial Accounts of the United States as of 2012Q4 and information 
contained in BCBS (2010 and 2013). See the Internet Appendix for further details.  
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Table 1 
US commercial bank balance sheet composition, 2012 
 
   This table illustrates the balance sheet composition of US commercial banks as of December 31, 
2012 using Call Report data. We restrict attention to commercial banks with assets greater than $1 
billion. Collapsing all commercial banks owned by a single bank holding company into a single 
banking firm, our $1 billion size cutoff leaves us with 501 banking firms as of year-end 2012. The 
table shows the value-weighted average balance sheet shares and (the equal-weighted) 90th and 10th 
percentiles of bank balance sheet shares. Panel A shows results for all banks. Panel B shows results 
for highly capitalized banks whose equity-to-assets ratio exceeds the industry median. 
 
 Panel A:  
All banks 
 Panel B:  
Highly capitalized banks 
 VW 
Average 
90th  
%-tile 
10th  
%-tile 
 VW 
Average 
90th  
%-tile 
10th  
%-tile 
Loans (gross) 52.9% 78.1% 42.2%  58.1% 78.1% 43.0% 
  Real estate 25.2% 62.0% 19.7%  27.4% 62.2% 17.6% 
    Residential 16.2% 26.1% 3.6%  18.1% 25.1% 2.9% 
    Commercial 9.0% 43.1% 9.7%  9.3% 43.8% 6.4% 
  C&I 9.7% 20.7% 3.0%  11.1% 23.4% 3.1% 
  Consumer 9.3% 9.2% 0.2%  10.4% 11.0% 0.1% 
  Other 8.7% 8.8% 0.1%  9.2% 8.5% 0.1% 
  Less reserves -1.2% -0.6% -1.9%  -1.3% -0.5% -2.0% 
Loans (net) 51.7% 75.9% 41.7%  56.8% 76.0% 42.4% 
Liquid assets 35.2% 50.9% 16.4%  30.6% 49.1% 15.6% 
  Cash and reserves 10.2% 16.8% 2.2%  9.0% 14.1% 2.2% 
  Reverse repos 4.1% 1.4% 0.0%  2.2% 1.8% 0.0% 
  Securities 20.8% 40.7% 6.9%  19.3% 36.9% 6.5% 
     Treasuries 1.6% 1.4% 0.0%  1.9% 1.2% 0.0% 
     Agencies 1.2% 10.2% 0.0%  0.9% 7.7% 0.0% 
     MBS Passthroughs 6.8% 14.5% 0.2%  7.3% 14.5% 0.3% 
     CMOs and CMBS 5.2% 14.9% 0.0%  4.6% 13.3% 0.0% 
     Other securities 6.1% 13.4% 0.3%  4.6% 12.6% 0.2% 
Trading assets (net) 3.8% 0.1% 0.0%  2.9% 0.1% 0.0% 
Other assets 9.3% 11.6% 3.5%  9.7% 12.4% 3.9% 
TOTAL ASSETS 100.0%    100.0%   
        
Deposits 75.6% 88.9% 73.6%  76.0% 86.0% 70.3% 
  Transaction 10.2% 22.6% 4.0%  9.5% 19.7% 2.0% 
  Savings 44.5% 63.0% 23.7%  48.3% 60.5% 23.6% 
  Time 9.4% 38.3% 8.6%  9.2% 39.1% 8.6% 
  Foreign 11.5% 0.0% 0.0%  9.1% 0.4% 0.0% 
Repos 3.4% 6.2% 0.0%  2.6% 5.4% 0.0% 
Subordinated debt 1.0% 0.5% 0.0%  0.9% 0.7% 0.0% 
Other borrowed money 5.7% 9.4% 0.0%  5.4% 9.7% 0.0% 
Other liabilities 2.9% 2.2% 0.3%  2.6% 2.8% 0.4% 
Equity 11.4% 14.9% 8.2%  12.5% 16.2% 10.6% 
TOTAL LIABILITIES & EQUITY 100.0%    100.0%   
        
 
